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Towards a Cybernetics 
of (Mass-Media) Institutions 
By 
Klaus Krippendorff 
The Annenberg School for Communication 
University ofPennsylvania 
l 
Backqround 
1 met George Gerbner on one of those typically midwestern , 
ice cold , windy and snowless days , between Christmas and New Year 
1961 , at the University of Illinois ’ Institute of Communication 
Research in Urbana. 
1 had graduated from the internationally famed avant-garde 
design school in Ulm , Germany , spent a year at its Institute for 
visual Perception and had come to the U.S. full of far-out ideas 
about a new synthesis between art , information theory , symbolic 
interaction , communication , cybernetics , sociology , all focussed 
。n my main concern , design. To my utter disappointment and 
barely able to defend myself in English , 1 found myself 
photographed instead in front of the rat cages at princeton 
University and introduced in one of its newsletters as a German 
psychologist (by implications interested in American rats). 
Hadley Cantril , whom 1 had known through his early work on public 
。pinion and who had just left this psychology department for 
reasons similar to why 1 was now discouraged gave me a few 
addresses and the advice to look for a better place to study. 1 
talked to well known scholars at Har、rard ， MIT , University of 
Michigan and when 1 stumbled into Michigan State University , 
David Berlo and Malcolm McLean immediately offered me an 
assistantship. But when 1 inquired about who would be concerned 
with the social aspects of communication they pointed to the 
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University of Illinois , Dallas Smythe and George Gerbner who had 
already been on Hadley cantril ’ s list. 
The Institute of communication Research was attractive to me 
not only for its social concerns but also for its liberally 
administered communication program. It enabled me to study 
cybernetics seriously , expand my knowledge in anthropology , 
sociology , social psychology and linguistics and brought me in 
contact with a variety of esoteric areas then blowing through the 
campus. But communication became my new home and George Gerbner 
my initial advisor. 
George taught two courses , one on popular culture and 
another on social aspects of mass communication. Both were 
informed by his general model of communication , the notion that 
mass communication works very much like industrial production , 
Leo Loewenthal (1944) , and Marshall McLuhan ’ s cultural criticism , 
(1951 , 1962) initially only his Mechanica1 Br촉효g ， and by content 
analysis results. 
George ’ s 딛르E르E르1 뀐으약르L 으.f Q。mmunicati。n (1956) essentially 
was a contextualization of his early journalistic experiences 
extended to any kind of social agency. It starts with an 
。bserver of reality: "someone--perceives an event--" and 
continues with what he , she or it intends to do with it , "and 
reacts--in a situation--through some means--to make available 
materials--in some form--and context ," and , noting what such an 
activity entails , "--conveying content--of some consequence." It 
was an expansion on Harold Lasswell ’ s "who--says what--to whom--
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11 formula (1948) and associated with each of these verbal 
components an area of study or research questions he asked his 
students to explore. Much of his own research sought t。
illustrate the role these components play in shaping 
communication. 
The idea that mass communication resembled more the 효흐흐르꾀뇨lY 
lin으 으t: industrial productiorthan the popular image of a 
critical journalist ’ s or artist ’ s mind came to him from his half-
brother Laslo Benedik , a successful film maker with considerable 
experiences inside Hollywood. The metaphor of industrial 
production not only suggested a way of demystifying Hollywood , 
analyzing its politics , procedures , controls , financial and 
material resources of the communication industry in familiar 
terms , but also opened the door to Marxist criticism , describing 
communication as the mass production and dissemination of 
messa잉es and paying attention to its institutional structure , its 
hidden ideological biases , its economic power bases and the 
corporate interests it served. In Urbana , George was an 
。utspoken representative of this perspective. 
Following Harold Innis ’ footsteps , Marshall McLuhan ’ s early 
work had introduced 2으E브L효K f'.브lt브ζ르 notions and culture critical 
attitudes towards the transformations mass-media (including 
literature , magazines , newspapers and television) were thought t。
introduce into everyone ’ s life by their own symbolic powers. 
McLuhan put these media into the center of his understanding 
society , just as George described them as the principal 
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humanizing agents and reconstructed the whole human history in 
these terms. For George , popular culture and mass production 
were two , perhaps unequally favoured , sides of the same coin. 
The backbone of George ’ s research always was and still is 
드으ntent 효E르.l.Yli후흐 Whereas others sought to find ways of using 
verbal data to infer psychological states and association 
structures in speakers ’ and hearers ’ minds , notably Charles 
Osgood , who was George ’ s colleague and director of the Institute , 
。r got involved in evaluating press performance by journalistic 
standards , George never appreciated psychological research , had 
no lon당er journalistic concerns and saw mass-media content as the 
principal phenomena that communication research needed t。
explain. Loewenthal ’ s work on popular heroes in magazines 
fiction , perhaps also Siegfried Kracauer ’ s analysis of popular 
films and Paul Lazarsfeld ’ s distinction between administrative 
and critical communications research became cornerstones of this 
effort. 
In fact , even in his working definitions of communication 
and in his later delineation of the field of communication (1966) 
messages became pivotal: 
Communication can be defined as "social interaction 
through messages." Messages are formally coded , symbolic , 
。r representational events of some shared significance in a 
culture , ... The distinction between the "communication 
approach" and other approaches to the study of behavior and 
culture rests on the extent to which (1) messages are 
germane to the process studied and (2) concern with the 
production , content , transmission , perception and use of 
messages is central to the approach. A "communication 
approach" (or theory) can be distinguished from others in 
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that it makes the nature and role of messages in life and 
society its central organizing concern. (1967a) 
Although George never talked about his epistemology , he 
always considered messages as objective events that , because of 
their "formally coded symbolic , ... representational" and 
"imprinted" nature , have a factuality as unquestionable as the 
events they represent. This conviction led him to regard 
messages as part of an objective reality to be "unveiled" or 
"uncovered" without reference to an analyst ’ s epistemology , 
theory or values and without reference to how people might 
interpret them in public. He states: 
。ur contention is not so much that inherent physical 
characteristics of media as such , or that formal elements of 
style , vocabulary , syntax , are themselves of profound and 
direct significance. Rather it is that the nature and 
consequences of these elements and characteristics can be 
understood best if content is viewed as bearing the imprint 
。 f social needs and uses ... Aside from the formal , 
conventional "message ," mass-media content bears the imprint 
。 f concrete circumstances of its creation. This includes 
such things as external outlook and the internal dynamics of 
the producing industry; its relationship to competitors; its 
control over resources , facilities of production , and 
distribution; the position of its decision makers in the 
industrial structure; their relationships to audiences , 
markets , advertising sponsors. Out of these come a set of 
managerial assumptions--both implicit and rationalized--
reflected in large systems of content , and performing some 
aspect of its perception. The social determinants of 
cultural industry thus find their way into the consequential 
meaning of the material ... Unless the requirements and 
effects of a specific system of industrial and market 
relationships (such as the corporate structure) are fully 
grasped , mass-media content analysis remains superficial. 
(1958b) . 
Thus , although George consistently defines messages in terms 
。f ".ê뇨흐red .ê ianificancg" , seeks to show "what they call to the 
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attentions 으1: 르 으으꾀핀브E후.ty" and to reveal "what stories tell 브특" 
his content analysis play down the importance of conventional 
meanings and emic categories (the kind of understanding that 
members of a community could agree with or share) and the truth 
value of what these messages are about (what people see as 
factual or merely entertaining). within the analytical 
presupposition that communication is "industrial behavior in the 
public domain , " which can hardly be considered shared among 
audience members , his analyses are designed instead to uncover 
what he regards as the hidden , unintended , implicit and pervasive 
aspects of messages that escape casual reading but are 
。bjectively identifiable by qualified analysts , perhaps aided by 
statistical tools. 
Consequently , George ’ s research seeks to expl효후n .t뇨르 
￡ζ트요브르낀흐ygistributionâ in his own etic categories by (a) 
interpreting them as standard indicators , by (b) correlating 
these indicators with measurable variables of popular message 
consumption , to which mass production is just the other side of 
the same coin , and (c) by putting (a) and (b) into cultural , 
social , political and economic explanatory perspectives. Figure 
1 (which already includes a distinction 1 want to discuss later) 
shows these relationships graphically: 
Figure 1 
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To give some examples for each , regarding (a) , George 
interpreted the frequencies of occurrences in subject matter 
categories as measures of attention and used these measures t。
quantify media attention to mental illness (1959) , to film heroes 
in six countries (1969b) , to countries outside the U.S. (Gerbner 
and Marvanyi , 1977) , among many others. Regarding (b) , efforts 
to correlate content variables with other measures served to show 
the "imprinting" of messa양e characteristics and provide evidence 
for their social consequences. For example , in his "Social 
Anatomy of the Romance Confession Cover Girl" he correlated 
visual characteristics of magazine covers with semantic 
differential ratings by subjects (1958a). In his and Larry 
Gross ’ "Scary World of TV ’ s Heavy Viewer" he compared frequencies 
。f violence in TV with survey data on the perception of real-
world violence (1976) to which one may add numerous similar 
comparisons of TV populations with real populations , TV crime 
statistics with official crime statistics and TV attitudes with 
those found by actual surveys. 
While George ’ s quantitative work was simple and strai양ht 
forward and perhaps for these reasons not always accepted (e.g. 
Hirsch , 1980) , George ’ s main strength is (c) , to find challenging 
socio-political interpretations of his content analysis counts. 
He explained the social role of magazines in terms of where , by 
whom , to whom and in whose interest magazines would be sold 
(1958a) , differences in reporting an alleged crime in terms of 
the known ideological perspectives and political tendencies of 
g 
newspapers (1964) , the portrayal of mental illness in terms of 
hidden censorship and industry-wide controls in motion pictures 
(Gerbner and Tannenbaum , 1962) and later moved towards more 
cultural interpretations in terms of mainstreaming industrially 
profitable perceptions (Gerbner , Gross , Morgan & Signorielli , 
1986) on the one hand and power roles of decision makers 
regarding communication content (1969a , 1974) on the other. His 
characterization of "Television as a New Religion" based on the 
global , instantaneous and ritualized access by few individuals t。
the largest number of people in history (1977b , 1980 , 1982; 
Gerbner & Connolly , 1978) is a similarly challenging 
interpretation. 
1 always was intrigued with the novel connections George 
made , with his far-reaching interpretations and exploratory 
constructions. At the same time 1 also felt uncomfortable with 
explaining communication content as "objective industrial c" 
whose sheer massive presence would suffice to claim widespread 
sharing without the need to refer to possibly diverse 
understandings. Correlating (in the statistical sense) etic 
content categories with equally etic consumption variables and 
attitudes makes no allowance for individual choices to interpret 
texts differently either and when accepted as scientific findings 
perhaps even discourages new and deviant perspectives or raising 
questions of how society might be changed. The lack of freedom 
George attributed to readers , viewers and even producers , to the 
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public for short , stands in sharp contrast with the freedom he 
himself displays in developing his own ideas. 
Disagreements with a respected teacher makes one think on 
。ne ’ s own and since 1 always learned most from teachers that 
challenged my presuppositions , my course of study with George 
proved productive for me as well. In my University of Illinois 
Ph.D. dissertation , written after 1 had joined George at the 
Annenberg School , 1 sought to develop a new epistemological 
perspective for content analysis , one that was grounded in a 
contextual theory of meaning 1 had been playing with before and 
required the analyst to actively participate in the construction 
。 f the relationships between text and context , whether it 
concerned relationships between words and their linguistic 
surroundings , between social organizations and their socio-
cultural environments or between data and a theoretical framework 
chosen by the analyst. The context of data did not need to be 
true in an objectifies sense but cognized by the analyst and , in 
the case of content analysis , empirically relevant and 
convincingly stated (e.g. Krippendorff , 1980). This kind of 
content analysis did not rule out causal connections , for example 
imprinting , but granted the communicators assumed to be involved 
the competence of making the same creative choices of contexts 
and meanings researchers like George would take for granted for 
themselves. 
As its Dean , The Annenberg School provided George 
considerable resources and , having argued that messages should 
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not be seen in isolation but as connected and reinforcin당 each 
。ther ’ s consequences , he sought to move further away from 
traditional notions of "content" and engage instead in what he 
called ’ηnessage systems analysis." 
The first of these large scale projects was commissioned in 
1968 by the U.S. Surgeon General and concerned violence on TV. 
It came unanticipated. George felt unable to do it on its own 
and so , several of us at the Annenberg SChool , bringin양 different 
backgrounds and analytical competencies to the task , collaborated 
。n what turned out to be a tremendously exciting effort (Brouwer , 
Clark , Gerbner & Krippendorff , 1969). 
The initial success of such efforts and a content analysis 
conference we organized in 1967 encouraged George to build a 
superstructure on top of message systems analysis: the cultural 
indicators project. Based on his continued conceptions that 
"institutions packa당e ， media compose , and technologies release 
messa당e systems into the mainstream of common consciousness" 
(1972) , his cultural indicators project intended to be the most 
ambitious and global effort to take stock of mass-media ’ s far-
reaching involvement in cultural affairs. Seeking to build a 
cumulative data base for policy makers to make informed decisions 
in the cultural domain (1969a) , he differentiated his own policy 
。riented approach from those that responded either to burning 
political issues "dear to the heart of a political clientele" or 
to industrial and business interests in the mass-media , summarily 
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characterizing them as tactical approaches (1967b) 
(see Figure 1). 
There had been precedences , of course. For example Alvan A. 
Tenney (1912) (a founding contributor of the Columbia Schoo1 of 
Journalism) proposed a nation wide and continuous effort t。
monitor and record major changes in the politica1 climate and 
public consciousness by a systematic and quantitative analysis of 
newspaper content "comparable in accuracy (and intent) to the 
statistics of the united States Weather Bureau". Tenney ’ s ideas 
stimulated many quantitative newspaper analyses but the 
unavai1ability of computational devices at that time frustrated 
the extent of his proposal. with computers now on hand , George ’ s 
similarly global questions had a better chance. 
For his cultural indicators project , George defined three 
components of which message systems analysis was one: 
How mass-media relate to other institutions , make 
decisions , compose message systems , and perform their 
functions in society are questions for institutiona1 m;:으므르흐E 
효끄흐lYê.후A (later also called "institutional policy analysis" 
1985:17); how large bodies of messages can be observed as 
dynamic systems with symbolic functions that have social 
consequences is the question of 센g흐흐효~ sys후르핀등 료E효lYê.후2; 
and what common assumptions ,points of view , images , and 
associations do the message systems tend to cultivate in 
large and heterogeneous communities , and with what public 
policy implications , are problems for çultivati。n 르E르lYê.후E 
(1973:558) . 
。f the three , the institutional component is least developed 
and clear. In his initial conception for an institutional 
process analysis , he outlines a scheme for analyzing decision 
makers that do affect what the media communicate in terms of 
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their power bases , the type of leverage they command , the 
functions they perform , and the domain of mass-media operations 
in which these decisions are exercised. Decision makers could be 
individuals or groups and the source of their power is seen as 
residing in the structure of the institutional roles with 
leverage built into each (1973:558-562). Although George could 
relate several of his own earlier studies to this "first prong" 
。 f cultural indicators research and added a cross-classification 
。 f nine types of power roles , he recently observed: "Because of 
its direct policy orientation , this research is the most 
difficult to fund and , therefore , the least developed (Gerbner , 
Gross , Morgan & Signorielli , 1986). 
Against the backdrop of the foregoing , 1 want to make a 
contribution to this area of mass-communication research and 
。utline here an approach to the analysis of social institutions. 
1 fully concur with George ’ s critical spirit , with the large 
scope of social concerns he expresses , and am equally convinced 
。 f the central role of communication in society. The title of 
this paper contains "mass-media" in parentheses to indicate my 
uncertainty or perhaps unwillingness to draw a boundary around 
。ne industry or one technology and understand it by such an 
exclusive focus. The inclusion of agencies that connect with 
mass communication requires first of all a more gncomoassin다 unit 
으i 르E효lY득후흐 Second and consistent with my experiences that 
communication is a process , not a thing , and one that involves 
people in its own way , it needs a more 뎌y.!l효핀후으 흐E역 c。anizable
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￡ζ효꾀르쁘으rk .f으E 르E르lY프후흐 Finally ， 1 am convinced that an adequate 
understanding of human communication requires an goistemoloqy 
으르E르뇨l응 으.f .êelf-reflecti。n which is different from one that would 
suffice to understand rocks , computers , industrial production and 
communication systems from the outside. 1 believe a cybernetic 
epistemology informs such a framework , suggests appropriate units 
。 f analysis and unfolds a more cogent kind of truth , one that 
might be easier to live with than what the "scary world of 
television" currently encourages. 
The following can do no more than sketch out this framework , 
develop a skeleton of concepts , explore some general hypotheses 
and suggest social implications. Since the framework is new , 1 
have to accept the blame for all faults and overstatements that 
its repeated use would have weeded out , and since the space (and 
time) is limited , 1 have to apologize for the necessarily terse 
and definitional style. All 1 can do is show where my thinking 
goes and 1 will attempt to do this in eight sections: 
* Information 
* Noospheres and ecospheres 
* Institution 
* Social organization 
* Ecology of social organizations 
* Mass-media ecology 
* A cybernetics of mass-media ecology 
* A cybernetics of cybernetics 
for mass-communication research 
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The first six sections define and elaborate on a few key 
terms that exemplify the spirit of the approach I am taking. The 
seventh assembles them into a picture that communication 
researchers might not find unfamiliar but is viewed here from an 
unfamiliar perspective. In the last section I am carrying this 
perspective to its logical conclusion and return to a critique of 
the concepts that I deliberately avoid in the picture I am 
painting thus showing its divergence from George ’ s approach t。
media institutions. 
eplgen~sls 
DNA 
1iving 
organism 
Figure 2 
。ntogenesis
perturbations 
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Information 
The word "information" has many meanings includin앙 that of 
meaning. 1 will not review its etymology or alternative 
conceptions and plunge right into the notion convenient here: 
informati。n 후흐 t뇨g 1.으g후으효1. 으1: 。raanizational 꼬으rk !! .Q효t호르rn 
르E효뇨4르등 후후흐 흐g으g호X르1:.t으 효으 A prototypical though limiting 
example is DNA. It consists of a particular string of genes 
whose chemical substances do not really matter except for the 
spacial configuration or pattern it manifests. By itself DNA 
knows nothing , does nothing , intends nothing , represents nothing , 
contains no significant amount of energy and quickly 
disintegrates. Only when implanted into a fertile environment , a 
womb , does it start realizing its potential , engages a network of 
interaction with available components , organizes them around 
itself and thus coordinates the growth of a living organism , 
including the capacity to reproduce a copy of the very DNA that 
initiated the process. Thus , information is not energy , as 
wiener (1948) always insisted , not a thing , not even a message 
that could be separated from its context. It indicates 효 
g효호호르ζ~흐 E으호E쁘펀1. 호으 요브펴g 효낀 。ntoaonetiQ .Q1:으으g흐를 whose 
complement is the re-storing (bringing back to storage and 
transmission) of DNA by an adult organism and is here called 
epigenesis. Both are depicted in Figure 2. 
Figure 2 
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1 am adding an arrow labeled perturbations to indicate that 
the circular process takes place in a medium and may be subject 
to mutation and other disturbances unknowable from the inside , 
causing the process of reproduction to drift. 
In the social domain , blueprints , recipes , fairy tales and 
TV shows have similar capabilities. A blueprint , for example , 
when given to a building contractor who commands the necessary 
human and material resources to build many kinds of structures , 
enables him to set an organizational process in motion that is 
selective of people , coordinates their work , directs the flow of 
materials and ultimately leaves a certain kind of building 
behind. Just as in DNA and in blueprints , information is always 
tied t。 르 。articular 으으nt르xt whose dynamics it directs. The 
blueprint probably means little to a cook whose recipes mean 
little to a construction crew. However , unlike DNA which is 
exhaustive (specifies an organism ’ s growth process completely) 
and deterministic (leaves little to chance) , blueprints and the 
like leave their receivers considerable organizational options 
including to reject them. To build a house requires much more 
information than a blueprint could provide (ranging from 
knowledge of building codes to acquired professional skills) , and 
the process could not be realized without providing some 
collective benefit. Also unlike DNA , artifacts or the processes 
that produce them rarely create their own blueprints except with 
the help of people that make images , tell stories , offer 
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descriptions , write organizational manuals or create theories 
that eventually enable the very process they emerge from to be 
recreated at another place , at another point in time and in a 
different materiality. 
If one were to analyze the information provided by a 
socially relevant message in the context of such a cycle , one 
would not ask what it physically contains , what it refers to or 
what its appropriate paraphrases may be , but what it enables 
someone to do with it , the activities it encourages or 
constrains , the distinctions it brin당s forth to someone , the role 
it can play in a receiver ’ s life , the regulatory capability it 
has in the face of given perturbations--all in the context of 
required and available resources. Kenneth Boulding (1978) 
describes this information as "know how" not "know what." 
Indeed , many crime stories invented for television have found 
imitators and popular celebrities are adopted as models by 
members of a community provided these receivers have the 
resources and incentives to realize them in their own lives. 
Asking questions regarding ontogenesis may bring us closer t。
understanding public media in the IIξ으으르흐등 으￡ 꾀aking 흐으으iety 
뇨효llll르낀 than asking the traditional questions of representation , 
content (correspondence and truth). 
Generalizing the diagram for DNA to the social domain leads 
us to Figure 3 
Figure 3 
know-how 
re-storation realization 
process perturbations 
Figure 3 
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In biology some say that living organisms are the clever 
inventions of DNA to reproduce itself. Others characterize DNA 
as the endowment a parent organism passes to its offsprings. 
What unites both views and generalizes to the social domain is 
that the circularity :ru;:르흐르rv르등 호뇨르 g으ζ르nt후르1. 으i 흐11 ong으후119 
g트ne흐후흐 Information is an essential ingredient of society as 
well , whether in the form of a continuous inter-translation of 
theory and practice , public knowledge and everyday life or of 
technol。당ical know-how and the ecology of artifacts it keeps in 
motion. 
I am offering this concept of information also as a richer 
alternative to the notion of power in social discourse but will 
later comment on why. 
N。osoheres and ecosoheres 
It is important to keep the enabling pattern , know-how or 
information , analytically distinct from the actual processes they 
enable to be realized else it is difficult to understand what 
communication does. In biology the distinction between genes and 
living organisms and between a genosphere and a phenosphere 
proved enormously productive. Boulding (1978) draws an analogous 
distinction between the 11으으.ê.!2뇨ere that contains all the know-how 
knowledge available in a culture and the 르으으sohe호르 that contains 
all the artifacts a culture brings into interaction at a time , 
including socialized human beings and social organizations which 
are man-made as well. Following Carl G. Jung , Gregory and Mary 
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Catherine Bateson (1987) made a related distinction between 
으ζ르효뇨묘ζ르， the world we draw distinctions in and thereby make , and 
I2.l르E으E효， the world of undifferentiated continua that we know 
nothing about but live in and that occasionally interferes with 
。r perturbs our actions. Creatura embraces both of Boulding ’ s 
spheres and 1 see pleroma as the medium in which the circular 
processes of ontogenesis and epigenesis take recognizably place. 
The distinction between a noosphere and an ecosphere is 
particularly important in the light of the different processes 
。perating in either sphere. Whereas physical interaction among 
people , machines , natural resources , and large energy flows 
clearly take their place in an ecosphere , the creation , 
construction , recombination (multi-sexual mating) of patterns 
through perception , thinking and above all their communication 
could be said to be defined in a noosphere. Anatol Rapoport ’s 
proposal that content analysis be concerned with studying the 
body of verbal corpses humans secrete into their environment as a 
system (1969) and George Gerbner ’ s message systems analysis 
(1969a) have similar foci on the noosphere. However , 1 like t。
see the noosphere of a culture or society be analyzed neither as 
secretion from an ecosphere nor as representative of something 
but as :t뇨g f:eoositorv 으f'!!..뇨료:t 후흐 PhvsicallV 르nd 흐으으후효l.l.Y p.으흐흐i뇨4르 
within a culture. 
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Institution 
The words "institution" and "organization" are often used 
interchangeably. George ’ s reference to mass-media institutions 
does not differentiate between them either. 1 believe a clear 
distinction is essential to an understanding of how communication 
enables the continuous creation of society. 
Etymologically , instituti。n comes from the act of 
establishing , of giving order to a thing , regulation , but also an 
established law , custom , usage or practice , a regulative 
principle or convention. In contrast , 。rqanizati。n comes from 
。rganism ， the process of being organized , but also the structure 
。 f interdependent or subordinate elements whose relations and 
properties are largely determined by their function in a whole 
(Oxford English Dictionary , 1933). 
Already in common discourse we distinguish between the 
institution of family , for example , and a particular neighbor ’ s 
family. Positivist sociologists seek to construe the difference 
as one between what is common to all existing families and the 
particular incident of a family. Although it is impossible t。
believe that ordinary people could know , are able to or care t。
find out what all families have in common , they do have a 
reasonably clear idea of what a family is or should be when they 
start one (even without first hand experiences in the role they 
are then taking) , when they decide who does or does not belong 
(Jorgenson , 1986) , when they evaluate someone else ’ s family in 
whichever terms , or when they decide whether a particular family 
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is broken. What a fami1y is is a1so instituted in written 1aw 
and then guides judge ’ s decisions in divorce and chi1d custody 
matters. A particu1ar fami1y is a socia1 organization that 
inc1udes rea1 peop1e in interaction and obtains its identity when 
those invo1ved invoke the regu1ative princip1es of (their own 
notion of) fami1y as an institution. 
Let me then define an instituti。n 효흐 흐 므으낀르￡르nt 흐트.t 으i 
requ1ative princip1es 호뇨르.t 트E효뇨L트 individua1s 호으 c。ordinatg th르호E 
b르뇨르X후으E 후E후으 defin후te 。rqanizationa1. 12효호후르프n within a particu1ar 
domain (a1so see Eisenstadt , 1968). Institutions entai1 the 
interpersona1 expectati。n .t뇨효.t.t브으흐르 interacted 쁘ith ç으nf으rm .t으 
후.t， .t뇨g 흐es후조르 ξ으 뇨으뇨av트 흐흐 르x12e으ted and a Ni11inqness 호으 효드호 으E 
deviation2 perceived in others. Besides an occasiona11y forma1 
recognition by 1ega1 authorities , institutions are 1.eqitimizeg Qy 
qeneratino 브E으1m으프트효 으!: 1!ncha11enqeg re으브ζE르nt interacti。n.
Institutions 르A등으 뇨흐ve n르잭g흐 흐nd .1르nd .t뇨eir 후브entity .t으 ξ뇨르 
。r여anizations 호뇨르Y.!:르르L후Z르· 
Thus , institutions rea1ize a variety of organizations 으￡ 르 
particu1a:t: ki끄역 (with the same identity) which through unopposed 
pattern of interaction among members estab1ish themse1ves as 
1egitimate in a particu1ar domain and in turn genera1ize 
themse1ves into or re-store (support or modify) the very 
institution that gave rise to it. According1y , institutions 
consist of know-how , have information , can be considered as 
be10nging to a noosphere , and are communicab1e through 
experiences , by examp1es , in the form of stories or by written 
22 
messages (law). In contrast , the actual interactions among 
individuals that constitute a particular or덩anization belong t。
an ecosphere , occupy physical space and take place in a medium. 
The processes that go on between the two are processes of 
continuous co-production or genesis in the face of perturbations 
from the medium in which these processes take place. 
Institutions also specify Q。nditionê. i.으.:r !!\embershi]2， the 
rationalitv applicablg within its domain and the already 
mentioned organizational_후뎌ent후1Y. The rationality dimension is 
particularly important here. It defines legitimate means , ends 
and optimizing procedures which may differ radically in different 
institutions (compare the cognized purposes of a family , a 
business enterprise , a church and a municipal government). 
Eleanor Rosh (1978) would probably say here that 
institutions are Q으gn후t후ve 。rototvoeê. against which the 
typicality of a particular organization (its deviations from an 
"ideal" reference point) is judged and its identity is 
established. The regulative principles that define an 
institution do not imply organizational hierarchies , however. 
。nly the accomplishment of recurrent coordination of behavior 
among members matter. Institutions are also not super-individual 
entities or centrally issued rules and regulations (even though 
legal authority may enforce some of them). Institutions are 
located in individuals ’ cognition and interactions and 
distributed 르객으n.g h브겐효.!l ]2articipantê. in 。rqanizationalN으므트흐se흐· 
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without human participation neither social institutions nor 
social organizations can exist. 
In sociology there is a tradition of distinguishing among 
institutional spheres , for example , the sphere of family and 
kinship , the economic sphere of industry , commerce and business , 
the political sphere of g。、rernment and the sphere of cultural , 
educational and religious activities. These spheres are formed 
by sociologists putting a great number of organizations , thought 
to have something in common , into one category and then studying 
the transactions between these aggregates. This analytical 
practice has little to do with my preceding distinction which is 
grounded in participant experiences and informed by 
anthropological notions of institution , their expression in 
language and cognition , and intended to shed light on 
communication processes for which these objectifies sociological 
categories leave little room. 
s。cial oraanization 
In contrast to institutions , social organizations are real , 
involve an infrastructure of people , artifacts , communications , 
and operate in a medium of available resources including 
potential members and other organizations they may interact with 
and thrive on. Organizations may grow in size (by whichever 
measure) stay where they are or even perish , but always are in 
the process of realizing and re-storing the potential inherent in 
the institution to which they thereby belong and may do this 
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sequentially or concurrently involving same or different 
individuals. The same group of individuals could êeauentiallv 
constitute themselves as a town meeting , as a country fair or as 
a religious congregation by each taking different roles. A 
particular institution also could give birth to a whole 
n。nulati。n 으i Q。ncurrent oraanizationê , each involving different 
individuals at any one time as in advertising agencies , film 
producers or families. It is also common for individuals to move 
through an organization without affecting it , through employee 
turnover , for example , or joint memberships as when members of 
。ne organization sit on the board of another. There is more 
fluidity in social organizations than we commonly think. In this 
context , social 。raanizationS 효프르 겐으re I?흐tt르ζne역 m;:으으르흐흐르흐 E뇨효ξ 
피<lY9.르으으겐E으흐르 르nd 1::eassemble themselves 효호 흐iffeζ르nt 호후잭르흐 후E 
효후ff르흐르nt Il.l효으르흐 with institutions being the medium through which 
the reproduction and dissemination of coordination of human 
interaction takes place. The diagram in Figure 3 applies here as 
well. 
I have to say here that I am not a functionalist wh。
believes that all social organizations are designed to pursue a 
particular goal , require consensus among members as to their 
purpose , must be organized in a hierarchical fashion or that all 
individual acts could or should be analyzed in view of the 
contribution they make to the maintenance (function) or weakening 
(dysfunction) of the whole. There are some organizations that 
are designed with some purpose in mind , but m으흐후 j브흐호 뇨효~t。 
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exist by projecting the sequence of their past realizations int。
their future. In fact , when asked , most managers in charge of 
large organizations are unable to state their organization ’ s aims 
exhaustively and think about goals only in response to particular 
crises. That social organizations can preserve their identity in 
the face of changing membership or change their identity under 
preservation of their membership makes it misleading to compare 
them with biological organisms whose components , while 
replaceable , cannot help but stay t。연ether as long as they live. 
However , it is safe to state three propositions. First , n。
social organization can exist for long unless it deζiv르흐 효흐르g묘르t트 
브르E르fit흐 from interacting with its medium (environment) , 
distributes these as incentiveê. ;f으흐 narticipati。n to its members , 
and simultaneously maintains , improves or expands its 
infrastructure , relying on internally acceptable principles of 
rationality for this distribution. Second , no social 
。rganization can exist for long unless it can IIξ르흐르rve 효 
leoitimate 후흐르끄tity vis-a-vis other organizations , recruiting 
qualified members and socializing them into its own 
。rganizational culture. This means supporting , expanding , 
defending against threats to legitimacy the very institution that 
infuses "life" and encourages and coordinates the interaction 
among members constituting the organization. Finally , no social 
。rganization can exist for long unless it can observe the 
(manifest , and according to its own principles of rationality , 
self-serving) consequences of its own actions on its environment. 
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Thus the network of interactions constituting an organization 
must contain loops , however complex they may be , i.e. , ζ르드브ζE후X르 
m;:으으g흐등으프 involving its medium or environment , through which 효E 
。raanizati。n 으르끄 흐르르 후흐self. This circularity has elsewhere been 
called operational closure (Varela , 1984) , informational closure 
(Ashby , 1956) and probably is the most important organizational 
unit of analysis proposed here. 
To elaborate briefly , when A causes B, B causes C and C 
causes A, then A, B and C are said to be involved in a circular 
causality. A circle has no beginning and no end. Seeking t。
explain A, for example , requires one to go first to C than to B 
and back to A which was to be explained. Thus each participant 
in a circle ultimately explains itself via others and the whole 
resists manipulation from the outside. Similarly , when the 
communication paths through an organization lead to behaviors in 
an environment whose consequences are seen or fed back into the 
very communication paths that led to them , the circle is closed 
。r open only to perturbations from its environment. Thus , social 
。raanizationê. expl효후n .:themselves or c。nstitute themselves 후n the 
circularitV 으i th르후E 으쁘nQ。mmunicati。D ]2.효t끄ê.. Decisions made 
inside mark 효E 。raanization ’ s 르브t으낀으핀y. 1 hasten to add that my 
concept of information does not imply causality and the 
circularity that constitutes a social (as opposed to biological) 
。rganization is a Q ircularly (효E효 뇨en으g 젠브뇨브효llY) 트E효뇨L후ng one. 
To take another step towards the framework for institutional 
analysis 1 have been promising , let me take ecology as model of 
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interaction , one that probab1y is the radica1 opposite of socia1 
。rganization ， and then 10cate processes invo1ving the mass-media 
dynamica11y in between. 
Eco1oqv of orqanizations 
The idea of eco1ogy comes from bio1ogy where it is defined 
as the interactior1 르핀으ng 겐르1lY 12。Du1ations 으￡ 흐E으으후르흐 (not to be 
confused with the interaction between two or more organisms or 
between one and its environment) and app1ied there 1arge1y t。
anima1s and p1ants. As a framework for an institutiona1 ana1ysis 
it is attractive for four reasons: 
First , popu1ations of 를g르으후트를 L후ve 후ni뇨르후프 으쁘끄 environment 
。r eco1ogica1 niche to which they respond and which they organize 
in 호뇨르후효 very 으쁘프 Cateqorieê. Eco1ogica1 mode1s do not 
presuppose that different species share an "understanding" of 
each other and see their wor1ds through the same eyes (Uexkue11 , 
1940). Simi1ar1y , there is no need to assume that a business 
enterprise , whose members co11ecti、re1y conceptua1ize their 
environment in terms of products , markets , competitors , financia1 
。pportunities and governmenta1 constraints , construct their wor1d 
in the same way as a po1ice department or a church wou1d do. 
Each has its own rationa1 princip1es for converting resources 
into benefits of their own kind. Each has its own categories for 
rea1ity constructions. Each 1ives in a virtua11y different wor1d 
which does not prevent them from interacting with each other. 
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Second , populations of biological 등~으후르흐 흐으르:m.t으 뇨효끄요 
t으gg호뇨트.，;: ξ뇨ζ으묘요hQ으th .Q。moetitior1 for scarce resources 흐nd 
c。ooeratior1 for maintaining a common gene pool without which a 
species ceases to exist. Similarly , because social organizations 
。 f the same kind are constitutively alike , construct their worlds 
in similar categories , thrive on similar resources , including a 
common po01 of qua1ified members and therefore "understand" each 
。ther better than any other species of organizations can , they 
natura11y compete among themse1ves. However , from an ec010gica1 
perspective , it does not rea11y matter which particu1ar 
。rganization of a species does survive and how , as 10ng as a 
sufficient number of such organizations continuous1y reproduce 
themse1ves and re-store their institution (or institutiona1 
sphere) either by their own recurrent behavior or by joint1y 
supporting other organizations (e.g. for professiona1 education , 
research or lobbying) that wi11. 
Third , 르드으L으요후르를 ev으1v르 흐t르뇨1e .,;:e1ationshios 뇨르t꼬르르E 
.êL2르으후르Ê. To interact , different species need not know each other 
and often are categorica11y incapab1e of doing so except through 
the consequences of their own actions. From the perspective of 
an outside observer , recurrent actions and perceived consequences 
form comp1ex and increasing1y stab1e networks consisting of 
cooperative , competitive , symbiotic or parasitic re1ationship 
chains that simp1y emerge or are metaphorica11y speaking 
"negotiated" without outside intervention. (In fact an ec010gy 
recognizes no outsider , on1y participants). Ec010gies are 
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neither designed by a sing1e species nor do they require a 
centra1 ru1er or authority to function. An eco1ogy is not 
democratic , ega1itarian or just but responsive to every connected 
popu1ation of species. (A bio1ogica1 eco1ogy is a1so responsive 
to the human species , of course , but because we can neither 
understand other species we11 nor interact with them 
Ireasonab1y ," even though we continuous1y try , we experience our 
eco1ogy as rather unru1y and certain1y unmanageab1e). An eco1ogy 
is a radica11y heterarchica1 and distributed system. 
Fourth , gco1oaica1 흐yst르팍흐 seek ba1ance or 으으nv르1:9:르 호으쁘효E효흐 
흐으잭트 eaui1ibriunat which popu1ations keep each other in check , 
continuous1y check and maintain an optimum variety of species , 
and assure the most efficient use of 1imited resources. Gregory 
Bateson (1972) is one of many who described such an equi1ibrating 
tendency as 9istributed 쁘후등역으ID. But , whereas the gene poo1s of 
different bio1ogica1 species are sexua11y incompatib1e , in the 
noosphere , the institutions of different species of organizations 
are rare1y so distinct and 1aissez-faire under conditions of a 
coherent and purposive1y created noosphere can become 
patho1ogica1 as Bateson pointed out (1972 , 1987) or co11ective1y 
disadvantageous (Hardin , 1968). 
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Mass-media ecoloqv 
Let me now sketch with Figure 4 an extremely simplified and 
selective account of an ecology that includes such species of 
。rganizations as the mass communications industry and the public 
as constitutive parts , mass-media ecology for short. 
Figure 4 
The figure clearly does not do justice to the ecological 
complexities we know of. For example , the communications 
industry comprises stations , networks , wire services , 
journalists , production studios , not to forget the technological 
infrastructure around which it grew , a complex webb all by 
itself. The figure also excludes financial organizations , civic 
action groups , universities that do in fact participate. People 
also have multiple organizational memberships and flow through 
this ecol。당y as well. Nevertheless it serves the purpose of the 
argument and includes some of Figure 1 for it is the role of 
communication research I will end this paper with. 
In this figure , one may see several circles. The money flow 
from the public to the market to industrial production and back 
in the form of compensation for work , regulates the consumption 
。 f goods , services and energy by the public. Money naturally 
flows in a direction opposite the flows of matter and energy. 
Several circles involve advertising and marketing in various 
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capacities. As the industry ’ s eye on the market , advertising and 
marketing is imp1icated in optimizing the f10w of goods and 
services. As the arm of industria1 production it creates c 
advertisements and financia11y supports mass communication which 
in turn de1ivers favourab1e markets. One may a1so observe that 
the money that pays for the communications industry ’ s behavior in 
the pub1ic domain comes via advertising , via industria1 
production , sa1es and consumption of goods and services and 
u1timate1y from the pub1ic ’ s earnings for contributing productive 
work. As George Gerbner (1977a) noted , this is a heavy tax paid 
by the pub1ic for entertainment be1ieved to be free of charge. 
But the most important circ1e invo1ves a11 five species of 
。rganizations.
Arrows in Figure 4 do not represent causes but information 
f1ows. They therefore do not depict what (mu1ti-causa11y , 
conditiona11y , probabi1istica11y or structura11y) "determines" 
the occurrence of an event but the f10w of ~르tter낀흐 호뇨at enab1르 
1ogica1 worlζ (computation or decision making) or organizationa1 
work (regu1ation , coordination of interaction) to be performed. 
The circu1arities in which the mass-media are imp1icated are 
르E흐뇨1ing Q ircu1aritieg: one pattern enab1es its receiver t。
create another pattern that enab1es some other receiver ... and 
the who1e chain u1timate1y proves itse1f as a viab1e pattern t。
a11 participants within the circ1e. The circu1ar enab1ement may 
u1timate1y become a recurrent process that reinforces its own 
practice. 
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In this ecology , money is not seen as causing anything 
either. Money does not provide know-how by itself. It is an 
(economic) enabler in its purest form but useful only in 
conjunction with specific know-how from elsewhere. In an ecology 
。f social organizations money becomes a co-driver of the 
informational enabling process. 
Note also the role of perturbations in a mass-media ecology. 
Events may enter from the outside and are capable of introducing 
unexpected variations , disturbances or "news." Such 
perturbations may reverberate throughout an ecology , are 
systematically transformed in passing or rejected already at the 
entry point. Traditionally , and with a journalistic perspective 
and linear communication conceptions in mind , one may confuse 
such perturbations with the content of communication , with what 
news is expected to bring to public attention. My point is that 
within a mass-media ecology the information communicated 
throughout an ecological network , including as messages , goods 
services , money and interorganizational exchanges and agreements , 
pertains first of all to its own circular enabling processes. It 
is invented largely within these processes and supports or will 
at least not work against the continuous reproduction of the 
network , connecting a great many organizations as participants at 
different points in their processes , each for their own benefits. 
Only secondarily may the circularities be seen as perturbed by 
。utside events. If they are , information about events is always 
systematically transformed , incorporated and assimilated int。
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internally communicable pattern. All conventions from linguistic 
representations to journalistic practices exemplify such 
systematic transformations which outsiders who can claim 
privileged access to its causes may consider biased but insiders 
consider established facts. Only if information from the outside 
resists such transformations may it become a true disturbance. 
Traditional preferences for linear causal explanations initiated 
by outside events and the belief in a correspondence conception 
。 f truth are thus necessarily partial , and if the flow of 
information in society is circular , goes back to where it 
started , describing the one-way flow of outside events to a 
public and stopping there is seriously misleading. As a unit of 
analysis , a linear causal chain would remove from understanding 
the very institutionaljorganizational phenomena that make this 
flow possible. 
Note again that a mass-media ecology as presented here has 
no designated controller. It regulates itself through its 
network of interaction , establishes itself through the 
participation of each species of organizations , including those 
marked " regulatory" agencies which thrive on public information , 
perhaps as provided by communication researchers , and participate 
in the process by constraining perceived excesses. T。
recognizably conserve itself , each species of organizations needs 
to continually realize its own institution but does not require 
anything beyond a "myopic" view of the species it interacts with 
。r "sees." This is true also for traditional communication 
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researchers who can pursue their own communication model without 
a conception of the ecology of which they are a part. The self-
regulation of the circular enabling process is such an ecology ’ s 
most outstanding feature. 
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A Cvbernetics of Mass-Media Ecoloqv 
cybernetics originated in the 1940 ’ s when a series of 
interdisciplinary conferences culminated in a better 
understanding of circular causal feedback mechanisms , later 
called cybernetics , the science of control and communication 
(Wiener , 1948). It offered a new approach to understanding 
purpose , not as an unanalyzable quality of living beings , 
not by reference to a vital substance or divine force , for 
example , but as a consequence of the way a system is put 
together and behaves. Cybernetic teleology expl효후E흐 。r
predicts 흐르뇨르X후으ζ ， whether it is geared to achieve a goal , 
maintains an equilibrium , systematically grow in some 
variable or appears entirely random. It does s。 뇨X 
referen으르 호으 t뇨르 E르ζ꼬으rk 으i interactior1 underlying this 
behavior. Historically , structural-behavioral explanations 
are not new , but cybernetics also provided the mathematics 
and initiated the development of a new kind of machines 
pr。、ring such explanations to be sufficient. This had 
radical consequences initially in technology (development of 
automatic control devices , computers , and communication 
networks) , but somewhat slower in the conduct of social 
science [evolutionaryepistemology (Campbell , 1974); 
experimental episteology (McCulloch 1974) , cybernetic 
explanations (Bateson , 1972) and radical constructivism 
(Glasersfeld , 1984)]. 
since its inception , cybernetics has witnessed a wealth 
。 f conceptual developments , has acquired new definitions and 
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given birth to numerous disciplines , but çircularitv 
remained one of its pillars. Circularities are abundantly 
present in the mass-media ecology as described , essential t。
social organizations and built into my notion of information 
as the potential for ontogenesis. Pr으드르E흐 is another such 
pillar. Cyberneticians do not ask what something consists 
。f or is but what it does (Ashby , 1956). Thus , while social 
。rganizations are composed of people , the individual 
qualities of their members are less important than how they 
communicate with each other , the network of enabling 
processes in which they constituti、rely participate and the 
institutions they interactively realize. In this section I 
want to merely sketch three hypotheses of an institutional 
approach to the mass-media. The first two are derived from 
the biologist ‘Tarela (1984) , the third is characteristic of 
social systems. 
l끄 르으으L으g후es 으.f 흐으므호르1 。rqanizationê.，
흐g으브rS J.ve tu::으으르특흐르흐 으으nv르rge :t으E흐I효흐 흐I흐뇨L르 
realities. 
circular processes are describable by recursive 
functions whose definition implies that they are repeatedly 
entered into their own arguments and compute a chain of 
values analogue to going around and around the same circle. 
While some recursive functions are explosive (diverge from 
any starting point into infinity , like exponential functions 
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do) , in the non-mathematical world of finite resources , 
infinity does not exist and organizations that are 
constituted with explosive circularities "blow themselves 
up" , do not persist for long and become rare. Therefore , it 
is no surprise that most recursive processes that are indeed 
。bserved are converging (like the square root function or 
divisions by numbers greater than one) , even in the face of 
perturbations from the medium in which they are embodied. 
The behavior towards which a recursively describable process 
converges is called its g후gen-섣g뇨흐X후으~ (eigen-value , eigen-
。peration ， etc.) which is characterized by regularity , the 
absence of differences or invariances under continuous 
perturbations. Recursive processes can be said to regulate 
themselves with goals and values implicit in the network of 
interaction underlying this behavior. 1 will give an 
example before coming to the main interpretation of this 
hypothesis. 
If a farmer repeatedly plants the seeds from her 
highest yielding crop , the evolving strands will increase 
their yield until they reach a plateau at which continued 
selection is necessary to maintain but will then no longer 
improve that yield. At this point the recursive operation 
(of selecting seeds from the highest yielding crop) and its 
product (crop yielded) go hand in glove , one defines the 
。ther ， and constitutes an eigen-behavior. The farmer may be 
fully aware of the self-imposed recursion and desire the 
ultimate outcome even though the continued effort without 
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further improvement may end up being an unanticipated 
burden. Burden or not , the farmer ’ s recurrent operation and 
the yield constitute that farmer ’ s stable , interactively 
predictable and structurally determinable reality , 
regardless of where the process may have come from. 
In an ecology , a comparable awareness of its 
circularities is not required for convergence to take place. 
In the mass-media ecology of Figure 4 , advertisers will 
certainly know who their clients are and respond to them but 
may not care about the other participants ’ modes of 
。peration. Manufacturers tend to know their markets , 
appreciate the value of advertising and bring the tw。
together but do not need to be aware of the latent 
consequences of advertising in order to reap their 
institutionally defined harvests from establishing the 
connection. The communication industry knows where the 
money comes from and the audiences it has to deliver in 
return but does not need to go much beyond this 
understanding , etc. If each species of organizations just 
。ptimizes its own benefits by its very own institutional 
criteria and repeatedly applies the same operations on the 
。pportunities available information offers to them , the 
。verall recursive process carried out by these or덩anizations 
are likely to converge to an eigen-behavior at which the 
realities of each and every participant in the circle 
appears coordinated and reasonably stable , interactively 
predictable and manageable within individual spheres of 
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interest. It is the circular enablement within an ecology , 
not an overall system awareness , plus the individual 
institutions that regulate organizational behavior which 
gives the whole a certain direction , a structural purpose 
and the implicit goal of constructing mutually coordinated 
realities. 
Reality constructions need not be individually created 
images , models or things , however , but viable ontogenetic-
epigenetic l2.ζ으드르E흐르흐 뇨르호ween 효 E으으.êl2.뇨르E트 르nd 효n ec으.êl2.뇨ere ， 
흐E흐g르펴 throuqhout 효n~coloqica1 neξE으rk 으t. .Q。mmunicatior1.
If the repeated realization and re-storing of information is 
circularly enabling , then this process creates or 
constitutes realities that do not depict or represent 
anything outside that process. For example , most genres on 
television , talk shows , soap operas , quizzes , crime series , 
westerns , etc. did not exist before radio. They should be 
regarded as "negotiated" inventions that satisfy numerous 
。rganizational interests , whether for regular production 
schedules , advertising breaks , predictable programing , 
political interests , ethnic representations , civic concerns , 
etc. with realities thus increasingly fixed , TV networks , 
newspapers and radio stations may change hands but do not 
change the service to their audience members. 
This convergence hypothesis has been largely 
substantiated on the level of individual communication 
(Kincaid , 1979) , mass communication (Kincaid and Schramm , 
1975) , in social organizations (Rogers and Kincaid , 1981) 
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and is an underlying assumption in George Gerbner ’ s 
cultivation research except that cybernetics provides 
structural explanation of this behavior. The idea of a 
collective communication theory with multiple participants 
and no single source of control has most recently been 
developed by Wickenden (1988). 
E드으L으요후으프 으i 흐으으후효1. 。rqanizations 으낀흐nge 
!lY n효호브互효1. dr후흐.t'!!.뇨ile2reservin<1 호h르후E 
recursivities. 
As above said , recursive processes develop "a life of 
their own" whose realities are somewhat resistant to control 
efforts from the outside and can therefore be said to be 
self-nreserving. But what is preserved here is not a 
particular realization or everything that happens to be part 
。 f the resulting reality but its g끄흐뇨ling f!.ircularitieê., its 
coherence. When A enables B enables C enables A, all three 
may commit themselves to continue to relate to each other s。
as to preserve the process of mutual enablement but not 
necessarily its physical manifestations. Indeed , in an 
ecology of social organization there is a constant turnover 
。 f components (of people , organizations and artifacts). Each 
such change introduces changes in its material composition , 
form and membership without affecting the (individually 
experienced) process of mutual enablement. The hypothesis 
suggests that recursivity under perturbation may send an 
41 
ecology adrift and that this drift is neither structurally 
determined nor purposive from within. 
A new technology may radically alter the operation of 
。ne species of organizations and drive another species out 
。f existence , but tends to modify only the medium in which 
circularities persist. certain management practices may 
ruin one advertising agency but another typically already 
waits to expand into its place. Unsuccessful organizational 
practices may drop out of circulation in such drifts and may 
temporarily increase a system ’ s 。、rerall efficiency , but this 
implies little if anything about long term gains. Events 
intruding from the outside , new laws , unexpected economic 
conditions , social revolutions , etc. may force evolutionary 
changes in other variables of a system , cause the whole t。
adapt , drift into new territories but rarely do they destroy 
the underlying recursivities. 딛nle흐르 ξ효g 꾀효i으ζ후.ty 으1: 
narticinants 으ζ 르.t l르효st 으er호효후!l key III르yers 르흐g 르E효뇨led .t으 
participate 후!l!:효효후으르llv 흐후ff르rent !l트t쁘으흐뇨특 흐nd 르잭III으요 new 
E효E후으E르1 으ζiter후효， the 쁘뇨으L르 E으으브I등후ve p.흐으으g흐흐 샌르투르lv 
약rif흐딛 This drift is "natural" in the sense that its 
causes can not easily if at all be comprehended from within 
the reality constructions that a recursivity entails , and 
rarely is noticed as such. 
The idea that recursive communication processes resist 
。utside influences conflicts particularly with the 
traditional journalistic ideal of truthful (in the sense of 
。bjective ， value-free and observer-independently verifiable) 
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reporting. We are made to believe that news is new , caused 
by unanticipated outside events of social significance and 
is to be completely and accurately c。、rered by the media , and 
yet , we know too well that true surprises are personally 
difficult to understand and have hard times entering the 
self-supporting circular flows of information throughout 
。rganizations. Unless they can be phrased in familiar 
terms , seen as furthering cognized interests , or infringe 
。nly on the weakest or most dispensable components involved 
in a network , they are likely to be ignored. witness the 
practice of defining what is newsworthy and what is not , the 
planning of news events or news conferences , or the mere 
adaptation of traditional themes , myths , stories , editorial 
formulae to contemporary circumstances , using ancient 
metaphors to render the incomprehensible understandable at 
least as far as tradition allows it. 
Information in circuit first of all affects itself and 
thereby becomes constituted as real during repeated 
recursions. The unfolding of the history of mass-media 
content thus facilitates internal structural purposes. Only 
secondarily does a mass-media ecology drift , elaborate 
missing details , adapt to new circumstances , evolve or 
incorporate unignorable 、rariation into the flow of 
information. What accumulates in response to perturbations 
is information whose survival value is not knowable from 
within , hence the "natural" drift. 
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투!l 으으으L으g후으흐 으.f.ê.으으4효1. 。rqanization.ê.，
I르드브흐흐iv르 ru;:으으르를흐르흐 호end 호으 뇨g으으핀g 
institutionalizeg , gsneciallv 후!l :t뇨g ru;:르흐르E으르 으.f 
E브브L추드 c。mmunicati。!l， 호뇨브등 transforminσ it흐르lf 
(the ecology) 후끄보으 효끄 inteqrateg .ê.요흐호em 으.f 후ts 
딛쁘!l. 
As a model , an ecology accounts for interaction among 
populations of species that need not understand each other. 
No single controlling agency is required. None has a 
picture of the whole. 1nstitutionalizati。n is a process 
where accidentally arisen or consciously initiated 
。rganizational pattern become transformed into communicable , 
legitimized and regularized institutions capable of 
realizing networks of interaction similar to those that gave 
rise to it. Institutionalization is self-organization in 
the social domain. It is also a form of convergence that 
takes place in the noosphere in which language and human 
communication play decisive roles. Through 
institutionalization , the radically distributed nature of a 
social ecology erodes into an integrated social system , with 
regulative principles of its own , a social organization 
composed of different species of social organizations. 
Thus , in the social domain an ecology is a mere transitional 
phenomenon. 
One source of institutionalization lies in the 
advantage .ê.tandardized interface .ê. offer to participants. T。
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interact efficiently , manufacturing industry took the path 
。f agreeing on norms for types , alphabets , frequencies , 
connections. The communications industry evolved program 
schedules , as printed in 및뜨으브후다g ， and a vocabulary by which 
audience members can talk to each other , make appropriate 
choices and express their preferences through surveys and 
interviews. Promotional agents connect talents with 
production studios by established categories. Lawyers 
promote the kind of distrust that enables them to provide 
and argue the validity of legally enforceable contracts , 
thus placing an interfacing institution in between. 
Multiple memberships on the boards of directors of 
supposedly independent industries are still another form of 
institutional integration through the regulation of 
interfaces. 
Probably the most important source of 
institutionalization is the very information the mass-media 
provides to the public. The public does not merely 
participate as a component in the mass-media ecology of 
Figure 4 , it also is the pool from which virtually all 
members of the other organizations are drawn and public 
information therefore penetrates the institutional spheres 
。 f nearly all participating organizations. Since Harold 
Lassell ’ s proposal for a list of functions of communication 
in society is "the correlation of the components of society" 
(1948) recognized as such. George Gerbner says much the 
same when he proposed to look at mass communication in terms 
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。 f "what is related to what" (1969a). Indeed , it is only 
through some form of public communication that people can 
achieve an awareness of the system as a whole an overview of 
how the diverse constituents of a society hang together , by 
which principles the interaction intermittently existing 
social organizations are regulated , what options for social 
participation do exist , etc. However , the mass-media are 
not the only source of institutionalization. Others , 
regulatory agencies in government , expansionist business 
corporations , but also â으으후효1. :t뇨g으ri트5 으i !nass-communication 
g으겐E르토g with each other for providing legitimate accounts of 
how society operates and by which system principles it is t。
be understood and seen as regulated. As George once added 
to his analysis of (mass or public) "communication: Society 
is the Message" (1974). 1 would emphasize that such 
accounts not merely describe what 후흐， they also make society 
happening. 
In the competition for determining the direction 
institutionalization may take , those organizations most 
。bservant of the whole , most directly connected with the 
pUblic or most authoritatively involved with a system are 
likely to institute their own principles of regulation 
before others can. Indeed , since "surveys" of mass-media ’ s 
fictional populations have been made (e.g. Loewenthal , 1944; 
Berelson & Salter , 1946) , such populations have been shown 
to be heavily skewed towards entertainers , actors , popular 
heroes , celebrities and other ethnic favorites who are 
46 
largely "made" by and representative of the mass-media and 
whose social role models assure these media a continuous 
supply of talent , popularity and large audiences. Moreover , 
the mass-media promote a show business ethic which underlies 
their very own rationality whose penetration into other 
institutional spheres (for example the politics of 
elections , sports , even war) makes the mass-media a dominant 
institution and creates a social system that hides the 
circularities on which the mass-media are actually 
。rganized.
。n the other hand , social scientific theories of the 
structure of mass-media systems , which carry the weight of 
scientific validity in a manner to be described below , d。
compete with popular notions and those serving institutional 
interests and direct institutionalization as well. It is 
the willingness of communication researchers to become 
engaged in this "struggle" for institutionalization that 
makes communication theories socially relevant. 
The last but perhaps the most important consequence of 
institutionalization to be mentioned here lies in limiting 
the variety of cognitive models accessible to people for 
。rganizing their own lives. A mass-media system by its own 
practice , selectively reproduces itself and elaborates 
primarily those parts of the noosphere that are beneficial 
。r at least not harmful to the operation of that system and 
。rganizes the noosphere around the very regulative 
principles that legitimize its own organization. In the 
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extreme case , this amounts to supporting cognitive traps for 
individuals that serve to perpetuate the mass-media system 
as instituted and prevents individuals from taking different 
perspectives. This is accomplished not by the exercise of 
force , not even by deliberate elimination of options but by 
。verwhelming the public with choices that are 
institutionally irrelevant: choices among similar 
entertainment programs , choices among competitive (and hence 
alike) consumer products , choices among political candidates 
thatwill do much the same , choices among answers to survey 
questions that are neither binding anyone nor threatening 
existing institutions. (In the sociology of knowledge , such 
limitations are associated with a dominant 후흐g으L으요y. Here 1 
do not presume a noosphere to be so consistent and am more 
concerned with the dynamic its variety implies). 
A cognitive trap prevents individuals from shifting t。
larger perspectives , from seeing their world or themselves 
with different eyes , particularly when faced with apparently 
meaningless tasks , perplexing situations , or feeling of 
alienation or helplessness. Social scientists are not 
exempt from such entrapments. The seemingly endless 
repetition of research into manipulative notions of 
communication and attitude change , for example , requiring 
momentous efforts for only small gains in predictability 
might serve as an example. The trap results from believing 
this to be 호뇨g 으낀lY. notion of communication meaningfully 
researchable without realizing that this very notion als。
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provides both the economic basis for the communications 
industry and the conceptual framework for creating popular 
entertainment to which social scientists are subjected as 
well. 
Although the cybernetic framework sketched in the 
foregoing does explain processes that are essentially 
indigenous to a system , it involves scientific observers 
(me) as outsiders. When detached from their object of 
。bservation ， scientist are likely to see themselves either 
as superior beings , capable of an understanding the observed 
people are not , or as cynics who nobody listens to for their 
taking of alien perspectives. The two positions entail 
constructing people either as trivial machines with n。
creative capability of their own (Krippendorff , 1986) or as 
pathetic creatures unable to help themselves and doomed t。
be controlled by others , e.g. by "the system." 1 believe 
this is the necessary consequence of an epistemology that 
forbids observing scientists to enter their domain of 
。bservation and expects them to describe reality 
。bjectively ， that is , without awareness of their own 
creative role in this process. The next and final section 
seeks to transcend this outsider perspective on mass-media 
systems and develop a more responsible position. 
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A Cvbernetics of Cvbernetics for Communication Research 
Ever since Margaret Mead suggested that cybernetics 
app1y its know1edge to what cyberneticians do (1968) has 
cybernetic epistemo1ogy become an increasing1y fascinating 
venture (e.g. Bateson , 1972; Foerster , 1974 , 1979; Howe , 
1975; Maturana & ‘lare1a , 1980; Keeney , 1983; Krippendorff , 
1984; Sega1 , 1986). I am suggesting this auto1ogy (the 
app1ication of know1edge onto itse1f (Lofgren , 1984)) 
app1ies to communication research as we11. Communication 
researchers cannot but practice what they study , i.e. , they 
need to communicate their theories of communication. The 
app1ication of insights , princip1es and concepts of 
communication to how communication researchers come to their 
theories and communicate them to others , inc1uding to the 
peop1e about whom these theories speak , is , I am convinced , 
epistemo1ogica11y revo1utionary here as we11. 
I take it to be obvious that socia1 theories of 
communication are different from theories of how signa1s are 
transmitted between machines in that they constitutive1y 
invo1ve peop1e capab1e of 1earning from them. As human 
individua1s , we are not on1y the ones who make them up but 
respond to them as we11. Such responses may take the form 
。 f conscious1y accepting and app1ying them to our 1ives , but 
a1so of active1y opposing them in pUb1ic discourse , 
de1iberate1y vio1ating them , for instance , when they make us 
rea1ize to what we have been conforming before. We a1so can 
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invent new or better theories and make them true in new 
kinds of practices. Under these conditions social theories 
are no lon연er either simply true or not. Their "truth" 
depends on acceptance , practice and consent and those 
proposing such theories through their very publication 
cannot escape participating in the process they may thereby 
set in motion. 
That even data easily become invalidated by enterin당 
the stream of public communications is easily demonstrated. 
Earlier publications of content analysis statistics on 
racial bias in magazine advertisement and TV fiction in 
terms of frequencies of kinds of characters has made the 
population of the television characters a more fair 
representation of the population of viewers but shifted 
racial biases , where prejudices persisted , to not yet or 
principally immeasurable areas of expression. Feminist 
attention to male dominant language use , whether through 
pronoun construction , hidden presuppositions or 
stereotypical expressions , has increased linguistic 
awareness , modified sexual references in public discourse , 
created a new literature and area of research and 
significantly altered inter-gender communication. Theories 
。 f the emerging information society have construed 
information as a commodity and significantly altered the way 
corporations measure and account for their information 
processes and economy of intelligence. Making a big jump , 
both in scale and in time , Karl Marx ’ theories of class 
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strugg1e as the fundamenta1 basis for societa1 deve10pment 
has become an unquestioned rea1ity for revo1utionary 
m。、rements and the societies that emerged from them but d。
not work at a11 in the capita1ist West where peop1e took his 
predictions to heart , opposed the theories in pub1ic and in 
action and deve10ped another society instead. 
George Gerbner is of course aware of the potentia11y 
se1f-va1idating consequences of te1evision content. One of 
the hypotheses he advanced is that heavy viewers of 
te1evision vio1ence deve10p exaggerated expectations of 
vio1ence outside their home and are 1ess 1ike1y to go out on 
the street at 1ate hours , thus inviting crimina1 e1ements t。
ru1e the streets unchecked. That te1evision stories become 
truer as they are watched , particu1ar1y in the "main stream" 
。 f the f10w of mass produced messages is guiding much of 
George ’ s cu1tivation research and is a1so quite consistent 
with the cybernetic theories that stab1e rea1ities come int。
being by recursive networks of communication. George was 
featured frequent1y on te1evision , testified in the U.S. 
Congress , wrote numerous artic1es in popular magazines like 
in 및뜨흐팍흐르1 요뽀브L효1;:1:svcholoay ， ß.cientifiQ I1파르닫으쁘 and 
business and re1igious newspapers. His TV vio1ence data are 
also widely cited. His "message" certainly has been 
inserted into the noosphere , has been publicly discussed and 
has become part of the very television content it is 
concerned with. 
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And yet , I do not think his theories take account of 
the "institutiona1 truth" they might be creating by their 
very pub1ication (and George promoting them). Being 
invo1ved in a "War against Vio1ence" (1977c) , he certain1y 
wou1dn ’ t 1ike to bring about the scary wor1d of te1evision 
he describes , or see that te1evision rep1ace re1igion. 
Sure1y , he must be painting these scary images to be 
provocative. But then , any criticism that mere1y uncovers , 
。bjecti、re1y describes and scientifica11y predicts the 
"terrib1e things the mass-media actua11y dO ," must first1y 
be accepted as authoritative accounts of 띤뇨효.t 후.ê. q으ing 으n in 
fact. Numerica1 backups p1ay their symbo1ic ro1e in 
suggesting their undesirab1e truth. This becomes second1y 
disab1ing , for scientific predications cannot be a1tered at 
wi11 without denying their va1idity in the first p1ace. 
Such criticism is thus unab1e to serve as a ground for 
intervention , at worst reinforces or 1egitimizes the very 
practice it ca11s to question and at best initiates a search 
for convenient scapegoats or remedies from outside the 
system. Criticism that wou1d account of the institutiona1 
truths must create viab1e futures. 
Moreover , George himse1f is 1iving proof of a 
creativity and imagination that his communication theories 
deny those who watch te1evision , maybe just as much as he 
does: Whereas , he expects audiences to become 
"mainstreamed" by the massive presence of industria11y 
produced messages , he himse1f has become more--not 1ess--
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critical the longer he is exposed to this medium , etc. I am 
suggesting that the unavailability of institutional analyses 
。f the mass-media which George lamented may be explained not 
so much by the lack of adequate funding but by the 
epistemological difficulties traditional researchers 
experience in making their analyses applicable to their own 
practice , having to include themselves. 
The foregoing leads me to three stipulations , jointly 
amounting to the position of a new criterion for the 
validity of social theories of communication , here applied 
to the analysis of mass-media systems and institutions. 
They read as follows: 
First: 및뇨g으￡후르E 으i mass-media 흐X흐te꾀프 핀브흐.t 섣르 c。mmunicable
효E효 투르흐L후ze .t뇨eir own 。ntoaenesis 표후t뇨후E 후he very 흐요를호르ill 
호뇨~ 드L효im .t으 효묘득으흐후브르· 
It recognizes that acts of communication are acts of 
bringing forth or changing the phenomena they describe and 
demands this to be recognized also for acts of communicating 
theories of communication. It specifically stipulates that 
said theories be realizable , result in viable communication 
practices and reproduce these practices , perhaps in other 
systems as well. Of course , the most obvious media to which 
such theories must be applicable is an existing mass-media 
system it may redirect or thereby transform. The 
stipulation simply considers theories as information with 
advert1s1ng 
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。ntogenetic capabilities of their own. It implicitly 
rejects the positivistic correspondence notion of truth and 
the associated ontological assumption of an observer- and 
actor-independent reality that simply "waits" to be 
discovered. It suggests instead that the truths of theories 
lies in the process of making the realities such theories 
claim they can. 
Second: 및뇨.ê. 9。nstructi。n 으.f.t뇨르으ri르흐 으.fl!lass-media 등yê.호g겐등 
샌브득후 후끄으L브흐르 후뇨르후E 으효g흐t으E흐 효흐 responsible participants. 
It holds communication researchers fully accountable 
for the effects of their theory constructions and 
"findings ," not merely to a scientific community or an 
arbitrarily chosen reference group , but to the human 
constituents of the very object (organization , network of 
communication or system) their theory describes , informs or 
may bring about. Theories are inventions and born in 
freedom but also entail participation and taking 
responsibilities for their consequences. It incidentally 
responds to feminist criticism of the typically male 
construction of "disembodied knowledge ," which is rational , 
。bjective ， emotionally detached without reference to the 
knower (Belenky , et al. , 1986). Participation and 
responsibility implies that a theory not only works but als。
embody their creators. 
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Third: 및뇨르 으re효t으ζ흐 of 1뇨르으ζ후르흐 으i !!lass-media 흐y.ê.토르꾀흐 샌브흐1 
ru:.르E호 ￡뇨트 뇨묘핀효n .Q。nstituents 으i 흐뇨후르 흐yst르.!!! 후뇨g 흐흐젠르 
으으g:n후호ive 흐뇨il후ξ후트등 E뇨gy 으L르im i으1;: 1hemselves 후E 
c。nstructirill1뇨em 효nd 브르 쁘ill후E요 t흐 1.후ve 후n the v르u 
re효li호후르흐 후뇨르후ζ 호he으E혹으흐 으으브ld 뇨E후ng ab으브1. 
This ethical stipulation is intended to prevent 
。ppression resulting from the acceptance of theories that 
describe people in less than human terms and that could 
force people to be treated or become that way in practice. 
The first stipulation speaks of theories as being realizable 
(a theory that yields nothing , enables no one , simply is 
socially irrelevant). The second speaks of the 
participation and responsibilities of their creators. 
circumventing the difficulty of spelling out the human 
qualities that must not be retarded by mass-media theory 
constructions and research , this third stipulation 
guarantees all human constituents of a system under analysis 
the same cognitive competence , freedom and responsibility 
the second attributes to the analysts of systems shaped 
thereby. 
The form of such self-reflective theories is different 
from traditional forms. Theories that include their 
creators must be constructed within their very own object 
and the process of constructing such theories also as a 
process of reconstructing the object while it is described 
(Krippendorff , 1984). Figure 5 , which schematizes Figure 4 , 
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compares the domains of the three approaches to theory 
construction 1 have been discussing graphically. 
Figure 5 
Before relatin영 these epistemological concerns to key 
concepts in the institutional analysis of mass-media systems 
and institutions , 1 might add that the proposed stipulations 
derive in part from previous work (Krippendorff , 1989) whose 
full implications can not be elaborated here. Moreover , 1 
am also applying these to my own involvement in a very 
different domain , that of industrial design and development 
。f future communication technology , where new ideas have 
both technical and social consequences , not unlike those of 
interest here. Although design is always 
intended to be creative of reality , more so than scientific 
theories are believed to be , taking responsibility for the 
reality either activity brings forth is largely neglected in 
both domains. 
The framework sketched so far already reflects the 
cybernetic epistemology 1 ended up with here: it enables 
looking at social organizations as communication networks 
that change as they are described. It enables social 
researchers to responsibly participate in what is 
essentially their own affairs and it requires looking at 
institutions by being "kind" to their constituents , not 
denying them the cognitive abilities communication 
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researchers do claim for themselves. In the following 
contrasts 1 will merely show why these analytical concepts 
were chosen in preference to traditional ones. 
Informati。n y르rs브흐 E딩쁘er. In social science discourse 
and even in ordinary talk about politics and interpersonal 
relations , notions of power are rampant. Power is a 
metaphor from physics where it denotes a non-dimensional 
quantity that expresses the rate at which energy is exerted 
to causally effect mechanical work. In physics , power flows 
。ne-way only and is pitched against a measure of the 
resistance to change. Applied to people , the power metaphor 
entails that people are either powerful , powerless , or 
possess power in degrees and , depending on the rate of 
"energy" they have acquired , are able to force others t。
change. The use of power metaphors goes back to the early 
fascination with mechanisms and engineering at the beginning 
。f this century. Consistent with his time , Max Weber 
defined "power (as) the probability that one actor within a 
social relationship will be in a position to carry out his 
。wn will despite resistance , regardless of the basis on 
which this probability rests"(1922:152). Here too , power is 
an attribute of individuals or groups on account of their 
position , status and personality. 
In the social world , 1 am suggesting that power always 
resides in a relationshi12 bet쁘een people and abstracting it 
from its base , just to enforce causal explanations , is going 
back to mechanistic conceptions which even the "hard" 
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sciences have long abandoned. In society , it is ~ubmissi。11 ，
not resistance , that 후끄X후te흐 E으wer 호으 g꾀erge. The use of 
coercive force makes sense only where the consequences of 
non-compliance are feared. Authority is effective only 
among those who accept or grant its legitimacy and are 
willing to subject themselves to it. Social influence 
primarily occurs where those influenced do indeed benefit 
from changes. 1 am suggesting that the use of power 
metaphors in social theories and discourse diverts attention 
from the complicity by the actors involved , conceals the 
relational source of social change , and reifies a 
mechanistic reality construction in which the capacity of 
the powerful cannot be questioned and the powerless remain 
cognitively trapped in continued submission. Power 
metaphors always serve the powerful and describing social 
relationships in these terms only amplifies alleged power 
differences. It objectifies power , breeds the power of the 
powerful and disables people to get out of such 
relationships. People that become aware of alternative 
reality constructions may also become aware of their 
entrapments and will then no longer practice what theories 
。f power entail. The framework 1 propose is intended t。
encourage the latter. 
For this reason , 1 propose that the analysis of social 
mass-media systems and institutions be based not on notions 
。 f power but on concepts of information as defined. 
Information always presupposes options , some freedom of 
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choice , can be rejected and its acceptance is predicated on 
understanding , in its receiver ’ s very own terms , what it 
。perationally entails and the benefits that can be expected 
from adopting the implied practice. I suppose this is the 
way we read scientific books , watch commercials on 
television , follow road maps , apply technical instructions 
and should consider obeying orders as well. In social 
situations , information can not force anything. It enables 
its receiver to coordinate something not possible otherwise. 
within mass-media systems , information may flow through many 
paths , whether in the form of entertainment , payments for 
services or interorganizational exchanges , but the path most 
important here is from that system to communication 
researchers and back. It is through this loop that both the 
system and the researchers reorganize themselves and acquire 
interdependent identities. 
Enablement y.료E흐브흐 으학펀료L후ty. Linear causal 
explanations link a consequence to its cause , whether this 
link is conditional on other circumstances , multiply 
determined , probabilistic or merely sufficient. They 
presume relatively trivial mechanisms underlying both the 
phenomena and their models , mechanisms that do not involve 
recursive processes or internal circularities and can 
therefore have no "1ife of their own." Many communication 
theories are basically causal in nature , for example , when a 
message is said to cause a receiver to chan당e his or her 
mind or to respond appropriately. Notwithstandin연 later 
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developrnents , Shannon ’ s landrnark l'1<lthernatical 및뇨르으흐X 으￡ 
c。rnrnunicati。n was originally conceptualized as a statistics 
。 f probable causations. Here , words like rnessage and 
cornrnunication rnerely replace the argurnents in a logic of 
linear causality. Circular causalities have overcorne 
lirnitations of linearity (although these notions are far 
frorn fully explored in cornrnunication research as 1 will 
argue below) but do not respond to rny contention that one 
can not cause sorneone to think , understand or accept an 
argurnent , rnessage or theory. Hurnan cornrnunication is 
different. 
1 cannot develop here a rnore appropriate notion of 
cornrnunication except to point out that , while interactions 
through rnessages always are physically grounded , no doubt , 
causing sensations of sorts , what rnakes them cognitively 
relevant is that they enter as perturbations into internally 
coherent and intentionally directed cognitive processes and 
are interpreted , rnade sense of , or used there in a receiver-
characteristic rnanner. Cornrnunication rnay either disturb and 
interfere with intentional processes or , by looking for what 
we want to see and ignoring what we have no use knowing , 
facilitate or enable such processes , hence the association 
。f inforrnation with enablernent rather than with causation or 
catalysis. 
Explanations in terms of enablement no longer focus 
attention on initiating conditions , causes or senders but on 
relationshioê. :t뇨르:t K르으으iv르ζ5 낀흐X르 흐 드h으후으트 in 드으二 
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c。nstructin。 with credit to "senders" or enablers for aiding 
their (structurally defined or asserted) efforts. 1 am 
convinced , enabling relationships , or networks of mutual 
enabling processes are t~e backbone of individual 
participation in organizations , the constitutive base of 
society , and provide a ground on which mass-media systems 
may be understood. Recursive enabling networks drive 
systems larger than their participants and can thus provide 
structural explanations for individual , organizational and 
eco1ogical behavior. 
Particinati。n ver를브.ê..Q으ntr으~. 1 already stated that 
most communication theories are linear and cast into causal 
frames. There is a sender , a message and a receiver. There 
is the communications industry , a message system and its 
mass audience , or public , etc. Linear communication 
theories imply instrumentality and control and research 
guided by such linear constructions or geared t。
elaborating , defining and perfecting such communication 
theories or generating data on their behalf naturally 
supports social control. This kind of theory and research 
is what advertising needs , totalitarian governments require 
and various kinds of authorities can thrive on. It not only 
enables those desirous of controlling others but , especially 
when so much research , theorizing and scientific authority 
is invested in this notion , it retards other forms of 
communication as well: dialogue , healing , altruism and 
love , for example , and discourages awareness of the larger 
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fabric in which that contro1 is imp1emented. By reference 
to Figure 4 , 1inearity can be achieved by cutting a circ1e 
into pieces and 100king at one linear causa1ity at a time. 
Moreover , defining communication either by reference to a 
particu1ar technology , te1evision for examp1e , or focusing 
。n what is conventiona11y conceived of as messages , 
traditiona1 communication researchers tend to omit what does 
not fit such techno1ogies or conventions and embed 
themse1ves thereby in the 1arger system in ways that 
coincide with dominant institutiona1 interests in this 
system (see 1eft diagram in Figure 5). 
There are of course critica1 voices in communication 
research. But those who question mere1y the ends toward 
which contro1 is emp10yed continue to support the equation 
。f communication and contro1 and contribute litt1e t。
。vercome the he1p1essness , distrust , fear and oppression 
this equation u1timate1y encourages regard1ess of the 
critics ’ intentions. 
The proposed framework takes two steps away from this 
dominant tradition in communication research. The first 
1ies in the cybernetic proposal of viewing mu1tip1e 
communication 1inks as networks , tracing its paths not just 
from one mode to another but a1so back to it. 
Cyberneticians have found recursive processes in such 
networks to be far more interesting units of ana1ysis for 
they shed 1ight on the se1f-referential dynamics , eigen-
behaviors , rea1ity constructions , etc. , a11 of which escape 
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the study and aggregation of linear communication links 
between any two modes. This emphasis on circularity neither 
localizes and supports manipulative efforts nor does it lead 
to a search for ultimate controllers , foundationalist 
principles or prime movers. It always starts from and leads 
back to the constituents of a system (see the center diagram 
in Figure 5). 
The second step away from the traditional preoccupation 
with control is accomplished by formally enabling 
communication researchers to participate in their own 
constructions. The cybernetics of cybernetics for 
communication research or a cybernetic epistemology realizes 
cognitive autonomy to be equally fundamental for both , the 
social scientists that create theories of society and the 
people that occur in and practice these constructions. As 
seen in the right diagram in Figure 5 , this is not a mere 
addition or extension , like adding another node to an 
already large network. It puts the communication 
researchers as an active participant right into the self-
referential mass communication process they are observing. 
It realizes that the act of communicating about observations 
also is an act of creating the phenomena being described and 
it suggests a new connection between language use and the 
cognitive constitution of society. 
。ntoaenesis 으.f .ê.르lf vers브프 으낀t으L으요y. The naturalistic 
tradition of science calls for describing reality the way it 
is or was before it was observed or "tampered" with by 
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scientific observers. It considers an observer-independent 
。ntology the only meaningful object of scientific inquiry 
and all influences on it as frustrating this aim and biasing 
its results. We cling to this tradition through our 
methodological commitments as if it were the only way for 
the social sciences to proceed. Already the equation of 
communication and control , the belief in the ability of 
someone to cause others to think in ways they may not want 
to , bears the dilemma between describing the purposive 
tendencies of networks versus what exists. This dilemma is 
conventionally resolved by taking scientific observers out 
。 f the picture they are paintin연 and rendering them as 
superior , detached and value-free beings wh。 샌효y.!l으ξ 르낀ter 
t뇨g 띤g흐ld 으.f ot뇨gζE 댄브드h le흐흐 ζ다르후.:t: Q쁘!l. 
I am suggesting this 19th Century philosophy of science 
to be a trap , appropriate at best to distant astronomical 
。bjects ， no longer capable of contributing to a society with 
enhanced communication and near universal participation but 
conveniently supported by those social organizations whose 
institutions benefit from disabling social scientists from 
actively participating in a society that ~。ntinuallv 으re효호르E 
르E역 re으E르흐호으흐 으ζ 겐르ke프 후후E르lf . 
To take an extreme case , naive materialism regards 
matter and energy or the mode of production and consumption 
。f tangible goods as the decisive determinants of social 
life (as if it mattered to copper whether it is cast into a 
bullet or applied to a computer chip , or as if socialist and 
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capitalist systems would automatically emerge from different 
technologies of production). This is not to deny that 
matter matters. It does indeed sustain living organisms and 
consequently also the social organizations involving them. 
But matter , energy and money by itself can not and do not 
have the specificity to determine the particular 
。rganizational forms that do arise as a consequence of a 
recursive processing of information. Not only is 
information different from matter or energy , as wiener 
(1948) , Bateson (1972) and many others have insisted , living 
。rganisms ， social organizations and social systems largely 
determine their own pattern , are embedded in their own 
histories , contain their own explanations or inform 
themselves through the circu1arities of their own networks. 
To look for determinisms outside ourselves in an 
"objective material substrate" , in pleroma , is to belay our 
modern but nevertheless common experiences that we can , 
within physical constraints , make different things happen 
and that we can participate , by our very ability t。
communicate with others , in continuously shaping the 
realities we 1ive in. Reality constructions built upon 
unidirectional determinisms not only absolves scientists 
from taking responsibilities for their theories and research 
findings , but also blinds them from seeing the ontogenetic 
consequences of their own communications and disables them 
from making relevant contributions to an evolvin양 society. 
In contrast , the proposed framework for institutiona1 
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analysis takes a dynamic notion of communication as a 
starting point , carries it through to its self-application 
and encourages communication researchers to be responsibly 
involved in a process of continuous genesis. 
E으으L으요Y.Y.르ζ프요흐 꾀후흐흐르k르nh으L후흐ill. Social organizations 
in general and mass-media systems in particular probably are 
more heterarchical and self-directed to begin with then we 
are willing to see. In fact , we like to see pattern even in 
the face of obvious randomness and project dependencies 
where there aren ’ t any. For this reason I took ecology as 
an initial and perfectly reasonable model for how people in 
。rganizations can interact with each other recursively 
without requiring central control or a global understanding. 
I also suggested that in the presence of public 
communication , an ecology of social organizations tends t。
institutionalize coordination and erodes into a social 
system. This emerging holism is a natural consequence of 
social self-reflection , the workings of the mass-media , 
global interests including scientific inquiries into mass-
media systems and institutions , all of which compete for 
institutionalizing some kind of consensual practice or 
another. with reference to the stipulation given above , 
there are two forms of mistaken holism that can enter and 
transform a mass-media system as well: personification and 
。bjectification.
Personificati。n involves projecting human qualities t。
naturally multifarious , complex and therefore only partly 
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understandable social organizations. In communication 
research this has taken the form of conspiracy theories , for 
example , whose proponents interpret every seemingly unfair 
event , e.g. , the unequal distribution of goods , services and 
information throughout the world , as evidence of corporate 
intentions or imperialistic designs. Personification may 
also take the form of a reductionist search for a single 
controlling principle , plan , g。、rerning elite or leader , 
thought to have the immense power to coordinate people , 
events and economies to achieve its hidden objectives. 
Personification is evident in language use , metonymy in 
particular. It can offer simplistic explanations , shifts 
collective responsibility to convenient scapegoats , 
charismatic leaders or super-natural beings , and frustrates 
taking individual responsibility for participating in 
communication networks that constitute what personification 
veils. 
Obiectificati。n arises in characterizing social systems 
and organizations as composite unities whose members derive 
their existence from the larger whole of which they are seen 
as parts , are subordinate to its function and are , by a 
correct but dangerous extension of this logic , dispensable 
in that organization ’ s ontology. In such characterizations , 
analogies to biological organisms are common and general 
systems theory with its built-in preference for hierarchical 
explanations is prone to this mistaken holism as well. 
Examples of objectifications are found in statements like 
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"the whole is more than the sum of its parts ," beliefs in 
super-individual qualities , explanations in terms of 
unquestionable 。、rer-arching values , and finally in legal or 
popular constructions of social institutions as entities 
whose objectivity is entirely independent of their human 
constituents. 
Objectification is particularly prevalent in analyses 
。 f .t뇨g mass-media system (as if there would be only 으ne 
account) , seeking to establish its organization from the 
Q브I흐후날g (as if its constituents had no voice of their own) 
and explaining the behavior of its components as 
subordinated to an abstract 。、rerall objective , value or 
principle of unknown location. Such objectifications fail 
to see institutions as embodied in and interactively 
maintained by the human constituents of such systems , make 
no allowance for these constituents to have cognitive 
abilities similar to those scientific observers claim for 
themselves , especially regarding their creative 
participation , and are unable to describe communication as 
(recursive) processes through which a system becomes 
constituted as meaningful prototypes. Analyses based on 
such mistaken holisms would therefore have to be considered 
invalid by my stipulations. In such constructions , the 
institutionalization of personifications may be simplistic 
and diversionary but the institutionalization of 
。bjectifications tends to suppress awareness of social 
participation , creates respect for abstract system 
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principles nobody can call to question and legitimizes 
super-individual powers behind which oppressive structures 
can conveniently hide. 
The framework sketched here is intended to be sensitive 
to and reveal these dangers. Based on the belief that 
nobody would consciously submit to oppression or opt to be 
confined into undesirable cognitive traps , it suggests that 
the analysts of mass-media systems and institutions see 
themselves as part of the system their description may bring 
forth , shape or create , commit themselves to live in it and 
in anyone ’ s place. 
Conclusion 
When asked to apply their own theories of communication 
to themselves , traditional communication researchers must 
become painful1y aware of their own schizophrenia , living in 
two distinct and conflicting worlds , the world their 
theories describe , in which people are constructed largely 
as trivial machines of sorts , (Krippendorff , 1986) , and the 
world of cognitive competence and academic freedom in which 
researchers can invent and test any theory imaginable. 
Resolving this pathology by seeing themselves as part of a 
system their research informs entails a new epistemology in 
which the validity of theories is decided at least in part 
in competition for consensual practice , and the taking of 
responsibility for the ensuing reality construction becomes 
a requirement. It is my contention that social scientists 
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in general and communication researchers in particular have 
an obligation to guard against inhuman theories and research 
results in their own midst and in the system of their 
concern , wherever these constructions of reality may come 
from. Demystification has been a historical mission of 
science. To reveal dehumanizing communication theories and 
practices is a mere continuation of this critical mission. 
It is informed by new insights that human nature and 
communication is intricately intertwined and , after the 
invention of the mass-media , all embracing. George Gerbner 
has claimed this connection repeatedly. This paper merely 
unfolds the radical consequences of a different perspective 
and projects them into yet uncharted domains. 
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